One tale of property, in my own words by Galloway, Kathrine
Bond University
Research Repository
One tale of property, in my own words
Galloway, Kathrine
Published in:
Griffith Law Review
DOI:
10.1080/10383441.2018.1443385
Published: 07/03/2018
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication in Bond University research repository.
Recommended citation(APA):
Galloway, K. (2018). One tale of property, in my own words. Griffith Law Review, 27(1), 157-169.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2018.1443385
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
For more information, or if you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact the Bond University research repository
coordinator.
Download date: 06 Nov 2019
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in Griffith Law Review on 07/03/2018, 
available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10383441.2018.1443385. 
 
ONE TALE OF PROPERTY, IN MY OWN WORDS 
KATE GALLOWAY* 
Abstract 
The power of the State to alter the conditions of use of land through planning laws 
continues to attract attention and theorisation in terms of the possible intersection 
between planning and property. As planning laws become more complex, and by needs 
responsive to environmental degradation—including the consequences of climate 
change—land owners will arguably suffer loss in terms of the market value of their 
land even as the broader community might benefit. This article analyses the contention 
that land planning regulation is itself property—a claim made by Paul Babie in this 
journal in 2016. It does so in four parts, focusing on the way in which the law itself 
constructs concepts of both real property and of planning permissions. It analyses the 
nature, content, and source of the estate in fee simple in Queensland, followed by 
analysis of James Penner’s ‘bundle of rights’ argument to ascertain whether planning 
laws might feasibly be comprehended within this conception of property. It goes on to 
assess a planning permission in terms of Honore’s incidents of property before 
establishing the nature, content, and source of planning rights. Finally, it distinguishes 
the role of planning law in responding to climate change, suggesting that it is 
downstream liabilities rather than front-line environmental protection that is at stake. 
In conclusion, it posits a conceptualisation of property alternative to Babie’s own 
conceptualisation. 
 
                                                     
* Associate Professor, Law, Bond University. 
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In 2016, the Griffith Law Review published an article authored by Paul Babie purporting to 
interpret a blog post of mine published back in 2014.1 My post commented on actions taken 
by the then Deputy Premier of Queensland, Jeff Seeney, who had used his executive power to 
overturn a planning provision of the Moreton Regional Council. The Council had previously 
passed a rule constraining building permissions on waterfront land. The aim of the Council’s 
planning provision was to avoid potential council liability into the future, in light of likely 
rising sea levels consequent upon climate change. Mr Seeney’s Direction overturned the 
Council planning provision.  
At the time, and in defence of the Direction, media reports had Seeney claiming that the 
Council’s planning provision breached owners’ property in their land. While not doubting the 
government’s power to alter the planning law, I maintained in my post, and I still do, that a 
planning law while a form of regulation that might affect the way in which real property is 
enjoyed, is not property as Seeney claimed. 
In his article, Babie not only disagrees with my contention, but he appears also to 
suggest that I was in fact making a different argument from that clearly stated in my post. He 
claims that ‘it is unlikely that Galloway intended to separate regulation from the concept of 
property’, subsequently telling the reader what my argument ‘really’ is.2 By contrast, Babie’s 
argument is that ‘regulation is property’.3 
In this article, I correct the record by restating and expanding on my argument in my 
own words. I offer a justification for my stance as a question of law, supported with reference 
to property theory, and in doing so I counter Babie’s arguments. Despite Babie’s contention 
about my meaning, I did indeed intend to ‘separate regulation from the concept of property’. 
                                                     
1 Babie (2016), citing Galloway (2014). 
2 Babie (2016), p 612. 
3 Babie (2016), p 612 (emphasis in original). 
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That was the point of my original post. My response to Seeney’s direction was a lawyerly 
one: I played a straight—largely positivist—bat. Babie reframed my arguments from an 
abstracted and theoretical perspective that my original post never intended.  
To be clear, I do not disagree with Babie’s theoretical framing of the issue. However, 
my contention—as originally stated and not as reinterpreted by Babie—stands. To clarify 
also: I do not suggest that the separation of property and planning (including land, resources, 
and environmental management) is necessarily right. Indeed, I have written before about the 
problems associated with the failure of law to take a holistic view of land and an expanded 
conception of property.4 To this extent, I have sympathy for Babie’s attempt to suggest that 
managing climate change will depend upon increasing incursions into private property—or 
the reframing of the content of private property—for the common good.5 But in his article, 
Babie represented the ideas I expressed in my blog post in a way that I did not intend and 
contrary to what the words themselves suggested. This article returns to my intent, with a far 
more modest scope (largely descriptive of the law) than suggested by Babie’s (abstracted 
theoretical) response.  
This article comprises five parts. In the first part I identify the content and source of 
real property as a question of law, including its qualitatively different nature and differential 
source relative to the planning laws that constrain the mode of enjoyment of one’s interest in 
land. The second part draws on Penner’s ‘bundle of rights’ argument6 to demonstrate why it 
is mistaken to assume that a right to build comprises an identifiable, discrete, right in real 
property. While rights in freehold land might themselves be conceptualised as a ‘bundle’ in 
                                                     
4 See, eg, Galloway (2012); Galloway (2015).  
5 Babie (2016), pp 609-610. 
6 Penner (1996). 
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that there is more than one right, the preferable interpretation of that bundle is as a unified 
whole, established by the State upon the grant in fee simple.  
The framing of Babie’s argument is unclear about whether the ‘right to build’ 
comprises part of the so-called bundle of rights inherent in the fee simple estate. It is possible 
to suggest that the right to build is construed in itself as property. I have therefore in the third 
part used Honore’s own incidents of property,7 invoked by Babie,8 to analyse the extent to 
which a right to build might itself constitute property. In the fourth part I then establish the 
nature and content of planning rights to differentiate them from property. 
In the final part I suggest that Babie’s appeal to climate change as the unifying rationale 
for our apparently sharing a united conception of property, is in this instance, a diversion 
from the true intent of my original post. I then conclude this article by suggesting that Babie’s 
contention—that Seeney and I were effectively saying the same thing about property—differs 
both from my original words, and my argument here, because while we may share an 
understanding of the concept of property, for the purpose of this case study, we hold different 
conceptions. 
The ‘Content’ of Real Property at Law 
As with my original post, I seek here to engage with land law in Queensland—and not 
property more generally. Derived from common law doctrine, Queensland real property law 
will be familiar, no doubt, to other common law jurisdictions and will certainly resonate in 
other Australian states. In particular, my discussion here centres on the freehold estate in fee 
simple. It is the freehold estate that was the subject of the Moreton Regional Council’s 
                                                     
7 Honore (1961). 
8 Babie (2016), p 605. 
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original planning provision, and therefore also of the State Government’s Direction for its 
reversal. 
The estate in fee simple is the greatest estate known to the law—‘the highest and 
largest estate that a subject is capable of enjoying’.9 Contrary to an intuitive assumption 
about property in land, technically the estate is not ownership of physical land itself. Rather 
the estate is the far more abstract notion of a legal right to possession of the land.10 Further, 
and what gives an estate its characteristically broad extent, is that it will last for an 
indeterminate period of time.11 Lastly, the common law is clear that the right of alienation is 
intrinsic to the estate itself, and the courts will strike down an attempt to restrain alienation.12 
Regardless of the theorisation of the concept of property that might underlie diverse 
interests in land, and regardless of the contentions of government ministers,13 these three 
factors: a legal right to possession, its indeterminate term, and freedom of alienation, 
constitute the estate in fee simple as a question of law. 
In terms of my statement in the blog post that ‘ownership’ in land is widely conceived 
of as a bundle of rights, there are clearly a number of ways in which the freeholder might deal 
with the composite rights that comprise their fee simple. The legal right of possession might 
be alienated by transfer of the freehold, or a right of possession granted for a fixed or 
determinate term14 (ie the land might be leased). Rights of user such as easements might be 
granted, or the land might be put up as security. In this way, the freehold estate might be 
fragmented into multiple co-existing interests. The rights that comprise the grant however are 
                                                     
9 Blackstone (1765-1769), Book 2, Chapter 11. See also Gumana v Northern Territory (2007) 158 FCR 349, at 
[83]; Commonwealth v New South Wales (1923) 33 CLR 1, at 42. 
10 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, at 80-1, 122; Maitland (1909). 
11 Walsingham’s Case (1573) 2 Plowd 547, at 555. See also Edgeworth (2017), pp 106-107. 
12 Such a right is ‘traceable as far back as the statute Quia Emptores 1290’: Edgeworth (2017), p109. 
13 Such as those of Mr Seeney: ‘Jeff Seeney Orders Moreton Bay Regional Council to Remove References to 
Climate Change-Derived Sea Level Rises From Regional Plan’ ABC News Online, 9 December 2014. 
14 Radaich v Smith (1959) 101 CLR 209. 
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derived from the terms of the State grant which at the outset, establish the boundaries of the 
freehold estate—the real property. 
In his article, Babie has, however, extrapolated from the State’s role in establishing the 
boundaries of the freehold estate to explain that my argument was really that: 
what Seeney is saying in issuing the direction, apart from recognising the power of the 
state to shape what property means, is that the state . . . was going to take no action to prevent 
landholders from acting in ways that might cause negative externalities for other 
Queenslanders. Or . . . that the Queensland government would take no action to address the 
consequences of climate change.15 
As Babie claims that ‘regulation is property’ and that Mr Seeney and I are in fact in 
agreement that restricting a ‘right’ to build restricts property, it seems that underpinning his 
restatement of my argument is an assumption that the State, through regulation, will continue 
to shape the content of property rights after the original grant of freehold.  
Certainly, it was my contention that the State has power to shape what property 
means.16 However, I did not intend to imply that the State through building or planning 
regulations would continue routinely to shape real property rights following the grant. My 
view was and remains simply that the source of all land grants in Queensland is the State.17 
In granting land, the State exercises its radical title, perfecting full beneficial ownership and 
creating an estate in fee simple.18 The content, or constituent rights of—property in—that 
estate are prescribed by common law, statute, and the terms of the grant itself.19 The State 
                                                     
15 Babie (2016), p 612. 
16 Galloway (2014). 
17 Land Act 1994 (Qld), s14. 
18 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, at 81. 
19 See, eg, Edgeworth (2017), pp 108-109. 
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routinely reserves certain rights20 and has historically imposed terms upon the grantee as to 
the use of the land, to promote the development objectives of the State.21 The State’s radical 
title effectively assures it an ongoing interest in the land as a disaggregated aspect of its 
sovereign power, and the right to resume land is inherent in the State—an incident of its 
radical title.22 The State thus retains a right to take land, and to constrain its use according to 
principles of good governance.23 My contention is thus that the nature and content of the 
collection of rights comprising the estate in fee simple is shaped by the State through the 
terms of the initial grant and its reservations.  
It is true also, that the State may exercise its power to add to or take away from the 
rights comprising the freehold estate. For example, the Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 
(Qld) and the Geothermal Energy Act 2010 (Qld) each provide for access to freehold land, 
for the holder of an authority24 or a tenure25 respectively. Such access provisions constitute 
an exception to indefeasibility under Queensland’s Torrens statute where access has been 
granted before the titleholder became the registered proprietor.26 Such rights of access 
therefore intrude into the original terms of the State grant of fee simple, and through their 
expression as an exception to indefeasibility are recognised as interfering with real property 
rights.  
This example illustrates the power of the State to continue to shape the content of 
property in freehold, where the sum of rights is reduced to the extent of the new exceptions to 
indefeasible title. It might be argued that the revised boundaries of the landowner’s real 
                                                     
20 See, eg, Land Act 1994 (Qld), Chapter 2, Part 2; Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), s28; Geothermal 
Energy Act 2010 (Qld), s29. 
21 See, eg, Christensen et al (2008).  
22 See, eg, Edgeworth (2017), p 1157. 
23 See, eg, Longo (1983). 
24 Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld), s291. 
25 Geothermal Energy Act 2010 (Qld), ss20-21. 
26 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), ss 185(1)(i), (j). 
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property arise through State regulation, which might support a contention that regulation per 
se is property. However, the content of both the interests created in geothermal and 
greenhouse gas storage resources (for example) and the way in which they were created, are 
more likely to paint them as property than permissions under a planning scheme. Unlike 
planning permissions, their standing as property is reflected in the bounds of the indefeasible 
title which itself reflects the content of property in freehold. However, if new exceptions to 
indefeasibility are regulation, and if ‘regulation’ was in this example ‘property’, it does not 
follow that all regulation is necessarily property. 
In addition to substantive real property rights, there may also be diverse incidents 
associated with an estate in fee simple. For example, co-owners as between themselves hold a 
range of rights including a right to possession of the whole,27 and a right to an account of 
profits.28 Joint tenants hold a right of survivorship.29 However, despite the nexus of these 
rights with land and the owners, and their role in mediating relations between the parties, 
none of these rights is properly considered property.30 They are rights that are attendant upon 
real property but they are not property per se. 
Similarly, planning permissions are not considered to constitute real property. For 
example, in Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) v Immer (No 145) Pty Ltd,31 
the Court considered the nature of transferrable development rights—otherwise described as 
‘transferable floor space’. These rights derived from zoning regulations so that where an 
owner of land was prevented by planning restrictions from using to the fullest extent the 
                                                     
27 Wright v Gibbons (1949) 78 CLR 313; Peldan v Anderson (2006) 227 CLR 471. 
28 Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), ss42-43. 
29 Wright v Gibbons (1949) 78 CLR 313. 
30 For an analysis of the right of survivorship as property, see Richardson and Galloway (2009). 
31 (1991) 24 NSWLR 510. While the decision as to the status of the parties’ contract was overturned in Immer 
(No 145) Pty Ltd v Uniting Church of Australia Property Trust (NSW) (1992/93) 182 CLR 26, the nature of 
property in the transferable floor space was upheld, at 32-33. 
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permissible floor space for buildings on that land, they can transfer the ‘surplus’ to another 
parcel of land. The question in this case was whether these rights (to transfer unused 
development potential to another site) were interests in land.  
The Court held that transferable development rights are not interests in land.32 Such 
rights merely allow one landowner to confer a benefit on another landowner (the right to 
develop land more extensively than they would otherwise be permitted). Certainly, and 
aligned with Babie’s broader contention, transferable development rights in this case were 
found nevertheless to be proprietary rights: ‘They are transferable, and I assume 
transmissible; they are of large commercial value; and I see no reason why they are not 
“proprietary” rights in the same way as … patents or shares in a company are “proprietary” 
rights.’33 
If Babie’s contention is that the right to build forms part of the incidents of the freehold 
estate, then Immer would contradict this argument. Adopting the reasoning of Meagher J the 
Moreton Regional Council planning permission (to build) is not transferable, nor 
transmissible—although it might afford some additional value to the owner of the land to 
which it attaches. On this reasoning however, it is unlikely that such a right will be found to 
constitute an interest in land regardless of its likely effect on land value.  
Babie argues that ‘regulation is property’; that property does not exist without 
regulation.34 The implication of his argument is that he subscribes to Seeney’s position, 
namely that there exists a ‘right to build’ that is a property right, and that the State may alter 
that property, through regulation, to avoid harm to others.35 I agree that the State has power 
                                                     
32 Uniting Church of Australia Property Trust (NSW) v Immer (No 145) Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 510, at 511. 
33 Uniting Church of Australia Property Trust (NSW) v Immer (No 145) Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 510, at 511, 
per Meagher J. 
34 Babie (2016), p 601. 
35 Babie (2016), pp 601-602. 
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to create the boundaries of what comprises an estate in fee simple, and where it retains a right 
to resume property. This does align with Babie’s idea of an ‘inherent choice architecture of 
property law’.36 However, the legal framework of real property in Queensland—the 
architecture of real property—does not, in general terms, seem to accommodate the kind of 
ongoing alteration of the ‘content’ of the freehold estate, nor to establish a standalone 
planning permission as real property per se.  
Alternatively, if the ‘content’ of the freehold estate might be more accurately described 
as a bundle of rights beyond the scope suggested here, the more theoretical possibility arises 
that the ‘right to build’ comprises one of the ‘sticks’ in the bundle that constitutes the estate 
in fee simple. 
Fee Simple as a Bundle of Rights 
Despite the popularity of the bundle of rights conception of property—and it is eminently 
possible to comprehend the freehold estate as a ‘bundle’ or collection of different rights—the 
concept loses its potency where it is used in an explanatory way to articulate the nature of 
property itself. Penner, for example, argues that the ‘bundle of rights’ does not resolve the 
question of the content of property rights. Indeed, Penner suggests that such a conception 
falls into the trap of comprehending property as a thing, rather than as the means of 
regulation of relations concerning a thing: ‘the bundle of rights view does not get us beyond 
the obligation to understand property in terms of a right to a thing.’37 
                                                     
36 Babie (2016), p 611. 
37 Penner (1996), p 733. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in Griffith Law Review on 07/03/2018, 
available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10383441.2018.1443385. 
 
In what Penner describes as a ‘disaggregative version’ of the bundle of rights approach 
to property, the notion of property is constructed from the aggregation of each possible use 
for that thing.38  
The difference between the two concepts of property can be put in this way: We actually 
conceive of property in terms of a right which permits an owner to do anything or nothing with 
his property; the disaggregative bundle of rights thesis insists that an owner may do everything 
with his property. The former view accords with the fact that the law of property takes no 
interest in the particular use one makes of one's property (which is not to say that criminal law 
or the law of taxation does not); the latter holds that the essence of property is an infinite 
number of rights to use a thing, in the same way that the Hohfeldian idea of a right in rem 
entails having millions of rights against all other people.39  
If Babie’s contention is that a right to build forms part of the bundle of rights 
comprising the freehold estate, Penner’s disaggregative approach appears to describe Babie’s 
explanation of the right to build. It would also comprehend his suggestion that regulation is 
property in that each time a government edict affected any conceivable use of the land 
concerned, that regulation represents part of the bundle of rights that ‘is’ property in that 
land. ‘This view emphasizes in the strongest fashion that the very nature of property is that of 
an infinitely divisible composite, which can be disintegrated into or built up from less 
extensive rights.’40 
By contrast, Penner prefers an account of property as a ‘unified legal relation’.41 While 
there are descriptive elements of the bundle of rights theory that serve to explain the nature of 
freehold interests, understanding the estate as a unified whole better reflects the state of the 
                                                     
38 Penner (1996), p 734. 
39 Penner (1996), p758. 
40 Penner (1996), p 734. 
41 Penner (1996), p 739. 
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law of real property. In particular, it supports my own contention that however we describe 
the component rights of the freehold owner, those rights are established by the State through 
its original grant in fee simple.  
As Babie says, ‘the quibble here is not about regulation, but about where it resides.’42 
Both Babie and I acknowledge the power of the State to regulate, and acknowledge that 
regulation will affect the choices landowners have in relation to their activities on their land. 
However, his argument appears to reflect a disaggregation approach which contemplates 
regulation within the content of an extensive (indeed infinite) array of property rights 
affecting use of the thing, while my own situates regulation outside the real property interest 
per se. 
As a question of law, there is little to support a contention that a ‘right to build’ or a 
development right, is real property. Despite the freehold estate comprising or contemplating a 
number of rights, the argument in my blog post was predicated on the understanding of 
property in the freehold estate as a unified whole, bounded by the State’s grant. The exercise 
of human activity in relation to the land the subject of that grant was always to be open to 
State regulation—as is all human behaviour, consequent on the power inherent in the State. 
Such regulation need not occur within the conception of property itself. 
Permissions as Property: Honore’s Incidents  
While the right to build is unlikely to form part of the rights comprising property in the freehold 
estate, Babie’s argument might also be interpreted to imply that a right to build was of itself a 
property right, independent of property in the land itself.43 Babie refers to Honore’s incidents 
                                                     
42 Babie (2016), p 612. 
43 Along the lines of Reich (1963). 
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of property44 in a couple of instances,45 to support his contention that property is intrinsically 
constrained by what he calls the choice architecture of the law.  
Honore’s incidents include the right to possess; to use, manage and receive income; to 
capital; to alienate; to security; of transmissibility and absence of term; prohibition of harmful 
use; and the liability to execution.46 These incidents are reflected in Babie’s article, narrowed 
down to three general characteristics—use, exclusivity, and disposition.47 I suggest, however, 
that it is difficult to situate a right to build even within this conceptualisation of property. This 
is so whether one attempts to identify a right to build on land as property, but especially so if 
it is conceived of as being divorced from other incidents of property in land—or indeed, from 
the land itself. 
It is useful first to observe that a property right regulates relations between people in 
relation to a thing. It is thus enforceable against all others—hence Babie’s conception of 
property includes exclusivity.48 The right to build however, is not a right enforceable against 
the world—it does not lie in rem.49 It exists only as between the local authority and the land 
owner. It cannot be a right in rem, as it does not ‘[entail] having millions of rights against all 
other people’.50 The exercise of planning rights occurs through local (or state) government 
processes, which themselves comprise planning law or administrative law where an executive 
decision is taken. This characterises planning law, including any right to build, as the 
imposition of government discretion not only to grant the right, but to refuse it also, or to 
circumscribe it, as an exercise of government power vis-à-vis the land owner. 
                                                     
44 Honore (1961). 
45 Babie (2016), pp 605, 606. 
46 Honore (1961). 
47 Babie (2016), p 605, citing Radin (1993). 
48 Babie (2016), p 605. 
49 Ryan (1988), pp 56-57. 
50 Penner (1996), p 758. 
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A preferable characterisation of such a right is as a planning right and Penner’s case study 
of licences—‘the owner's changing the contour of the right to exclude in order to facilitate 
someone else’s use’51—illustrates the potential for the content of non-property interests to elide 
with property proper. A planning permission might be construed as stemming from, or 
affecting the right to exclude—and to permit—possession of land. However, adopting Penner’s 
argument, a planning provision need not ‘pre-exist [its] creation’. It is ‘created de novo’.52  
If planning provisions are indeed de novo permissions or restrictions (as the case may 
be), their character is very different from that of property despite sharing appearances. My 
preference for Penner’s argument, however, directly contrasts with that of Babie, who 
maintains that ‘the right to develop always existed; its scope was merely expanded and 
narrowed by Seeney and Trad respectively.’53 While Babie is entitled to hold a different view, 
it is incorrect to assert that the argument in my original post supports the contention that 
regulation is in fact property.  
To advance the argument, and to test whether the right to build might itself be property, 
it is possible to analyse it using Honore’s incidents of property. To the extent that the right to 
build involves a right to possession, it arises from the estate in land. Unlike the transferrable 
floor rights in Immer, the right cannot be alienated separately from the estate, and there is no 
attendant possibility of income from the right. Such rights bear no relationship to any right to 
build which is distinct from real property and its incidents. 
The right to security implies that ownership continues for as long as the owner chooses, 
and remains solvent.54 This is not present in a right to build. Likewise, and again, unlike the 
                                                     
51 Penner (1996), p 759. 
52 Penner (1996), p759. 
53 Babie (2016), p 611. Jackie Trad was the successor minister to Jeff Seeney, who subsequently overturned 
Seeney’s Direction and reinstated the Council’s own restrictions on building. 
54 Penner (1996)Error! Bookmark not defined., p 760. 
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rights in question in Immer, there is no right to transmit the right to build. While the owner of 
an estate in fee simple might transfer that estate including any development approvals, the so-
called right to build as an ‘interest’ is not of itself transferred or transferrable.   
Liability to execution is likely to be the closest argument to suggesting that a right to 
build is property, and Babie acknowledges it as relevant.55 Indeed its removal by state fiat is 
what prompted the Minister’s original statement and this discussion. However, while a right to 
build might well be denied by government, or amended or revoked by planning instrument (as 
occurred in the case study analysed here), this can hardly be said to be a liability to execution. 
The taking away of building rights cannot be understood as government expropriation even 
where such removal is done for the greater good. Certainly, there is no way for such rights to 
be seised and sold to pay owners’ debts.  
The absence of compensation goes to the heart of the characterisation of building and 
planning regulations as planning law and not land law. The nature of property is such that 
generally there are constraints upon state takings—even if only in terms of compensation.56 No 
such compensation exists for building rights in the Moreton Regional Council area. While this 
is admittedly a somewhat circular argument, the law that underpins this case study provides no 
support for a contention that a right to build comprises either a bundle of rights on its own 
account, or that it forms part of a larger bundle of rights inherent in the estate. This is reinforced 
by the nature of planning rights themselves. 
The Nature and ‘Content’ of Planning Rights 
The conceptualisation of a building right as inherent in real property, or as property itself, not 
only misconstrues the nature of property, but also misconstrues the nature of permissions 
                                                     
55 Babie (2016), p 606, at footnote 37. 
56 See, eg, Longo (1983); O’Connor (2010). 
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obtainable under a planning instrument. Despite an inevitable tendency of land owners to 
perceive of such permissions as part of their domain, the law itself differentiates property and 
such rights. This was the point of my original post. 
This is not to say that property theory might offer ways of understanding property 
including as performative expressions of social norms.57 Through such theoretical means it is 
possible to articulate how the law might comprehend quite diverse rights—awarded or repealed 
as part of choice architecture—as property. However, the power of the law and its operation 
circumscribes the nature and content of real property as a legal category, regardless of its effect 
upon the choices exercised by owners (or others) in relation to land. 
Reich in his seminal article might thus suggest that a planning permission be regarded as 
‘the new’ property. His thesis is that government largesse—‘benefits, services, contracts, 
franchises, and licences’58—ought to constitute property. His justification is the shift of the 
source of wealth over time from land, to government concessions. His argument is fascinating, 
and there are echoes of his justification implicit in Babie’s contention that ‘regulation is 
property’. Certainly, I have sympathy with Reich’s contention and there are economic, 
political, and social reasons why the conception of property, including as it is reflected in the 
law, is overdue for change. However, before this change occurs, the law is clear about the 
categorisation of planning law—as distinct from property. 
It is in the nature of planning that it may add to the value of land as well as decrease it. 
There is considerable scholarly discussion59 around the question of whether planning 
regulation is a taking—a question implying that the regulation constitutes a diminution of 
property. Generally, however, in Australian state jurisdictions, even regulation that 
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significantly imposes on the owner’s use of land will not attract compensation without statutory 
provision.60 Even where compensation is available, the right does not necessarily derive from 
the fact of property. Longo, for example, argues that compensation is more about fulfilling the 
‘State’s responsibility or role as the dominant source of property rights or wealth.’ 61 He thus 
suggests that compensation arises from this responsibility rather than as an indicator of 
property.  
In Queensland, the Planning Act 2016 does now provide for compensation for an 
‘adverse planning change’62—where there is a change to a planning instrument that limits the 
use of premises to ‘(a) the purpose for which the premises were lawfully being used when the 
change was made; or (b) a public purpose’.63 While this might include such changes as 
proposed by the Moreton Regional Council originally—limiting owners’ capacity to build on 
their land—the fact of compensation does not necessarily reveal a property interest. The 
framing of the provisions do, however, recognise the diminution of value of the land. Although 
the reason for a diminution of value might be the loss of some kind of property right that was 
previously inherent in the estate, as Babie might argue, it might simply recognise the loss of 
the permission to build. The argument in favour of property is not advanced by a provision of 
compensation. Such government action might affect how one uses one’s real property, but that 
does not equate the thing lost to characterisation as property. 
The Diversion of Climate Change 
                                                     
60 See generally, Gray (2007). 
61 Longo (2983), p 294. 
62 Generally, in Part 4, Division 1. 
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Babie identifies the theme of my blog post as climate change—a theme that takes ‘centre 
stage’.64 Indeed, the Moreton Regional Council changed its planning laws to avoid potential 
liability for any land-owner losses associated with rising sea levels consequent on climate 
change. And, it was the then-Minister’s requirement that councils not make any reference to 
climate change, that informed the Minister’s Directive to change the building rules. In turn, I 
observed that the Minister’s approach was at odds with commercial realities concerning the 
effects and costs of climate change. 
Integral to Babie’s argument is the point that ‘private property facilitates the choices 
(both human and corporate) about the use of goods and resources in such a way as to drive this 
enhanced greenhouse effect.’65 To this extent, he suggests that ‘[r]egulation, then, whether 
direct or indirect, forms part of the choice architecture of property, and it can, and does, take 
as its motivation the mitigation of or adaptation to the consequences of climate change.’66 
Again, there are two possible interpretations of Babie’s linking of private property 
regulation and climate change. On the one hand, he seems to suggest that regulation of private 
property might prevent, or inhibit, or at least not exacerbate the drivers of climate change such 
as greenhouse gases and warming.67 On the other, he suggests that such regulation will mitigate 
the consequences of climate change: desertification, increased frequency of extreme weather 
events, melting polar ice, and rising sea levels,68 with flow on effects of ‘decreasing security, 
shortages of food, increased health problems, and greater stress on available water supplies.’69 
He says: ‘In short, Galloway points to the role that the state may play in restricting property in 
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65 Babie (2016), p 609. 
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67 Babie (2016), p 609. 
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order to respond to the challenge or (sic) climate change.’70 I understand him to mean that the 
challenges of climate change include the important consequences listed above. 
For the sake of clarity, my original post did not go further than to identify the concerns 
of the Moreton Regional Council with liability arising from landowner losses accompanying 
sea-level rises. I did not contend that preventing building approvals for land likely to be 
affected by sea-level change would constitute measures to prevent climate change or its direct 
consequences.  
If liability for planning approvals on inundated land is a ‘consequence of climate change’ 
then my arguments do encompass such consequences. However, the primary consequences of 
climate change would be the sea-level rises themselves, along with rising sea temperatures and 
the other physical manifestations Babie identifies. Because of the economic consequences of 
these physical changes, there would be legal consequences—and it was these legal 
consequences that formed the backdrop to my post. I would not normally characterise such 
problems as a ‘consequence of climate change’, but accept that the law will need to grapple 
with a multitude of challenges. 
For these purposes, my point is rather that it is a long bow to draw to link the arguments 
in my blog post with analysis of property as a means of mitigating climate change per se. The 
fact of permission to build—anywhere—will not of itself alter the changing climate. What I 
wrote about climate change instead served to identify the challenges for local authorities in 
regulating land use in the face of likely losses consequent upon sea-level rise. In particular, 
Seeney’s view about property—and some fulsome right to build or develop—is at the front 
line of disputes about the extent of government power to regulate the use of land, and the 
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disquiet of freehold land owners at the prospect of having their behaviour regulated—even as 
they themselves stand to lose in the face of a rising sea. 
Conclusion 
Although I have here explained why I disagree with Babie’s interpretation of my argument, 
Babie and I do have more in common than we differ. We agree that the State constructs the 
boundaries of real property, and that the State retains the power to alter the way in which real 
property is used. We agree that effective regulation has an important role in mitigating the 
relentless march of climate change, and also in preparing communities for primary and 
secondary consequences. We might be said to agree on the concept of property.71 
Despite Babie’s interpretation of my argument as one that aligns with his contention that 
regulation is property, we do ‘quibble … about where [regulation] resides.’72 Babie appears to 
have it as the source of property per se, though whether that conception is real property or some 
other property interest, I cannot say. His argument is based on an abstracted conception of 
property in general, while my own conception of real property rests upon the law as written. 
In this article, I have further clarified my conception by referring to Penner’s view on property 
rights as a ‘unified whole’.73 
Waldron might explain the difference between Babie’s account and my account as 
representing different conceptions of property,74 where we share the concept in common. Such 
different conceptions are, in my view, inevitable and useful. By contrast, little is served by 
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denying that property might be conceived of differently according to diverse method and 
theorisation.  
There is no doubt that property and the markets it serves warrant scrutiny in terms of 
their effect on environmental destruction, including climate change. It is true that the way in 
which planning law is constructed and applied could do better at supporting environmental 
ends.75 However, the very issue that Babie purports to describe, namely that there is not only 
a relationship between planning regulation and property but that they are the same thing, is a 
conceptualisation that runs counter to the existing framework of the law. The law itself 
generates the very environmental challenges that we seek to overcome, notably from the fact 
of the separation of property and planning; from property and environmental concerns. This is 
no theoretical separation. Rather, it is a question of law and its taxonomies. This was the 
uncomplicated purpose of my original post. 
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